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ABUSE OF TRADEMARKS: A
PROPOSAL FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING
TI he widow of Ian Fleming decided that good money could be
made by registering and then licensing Pussy Galore as a trade-
mark for numerous diverse products ....
In April, 1972, the Fedral Trade Commission (FTC) issued a com-
plaint2 against four cereal manufacturers" alleging violations of section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 Among the alleged violations were
those of establishing and maintaining a noncompetitive market structure
and sharing monopoly power through proliferation of brands and trade-
mark promotion, which artificially differentiated products. 5 The specific pro-
posed orders included one that would compel the firms to license existing
and future brands or trademarks on a royalty-free basis for a specified
period of time. 6 Compliance with this proposed order would, in effect,
convert privately owned, registered trademarks into generic labels.
7
This article neither deals with the propriety of the FTC's proposed or-
1 Scheller, Trademark Licensing in British Law Countries, 14 IDEA 25, 30 (1970).
2 FTC Complaint, Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (FTC, filed Apr. 26, 1972) TRADE REG.
REP. 19,898, at 21,915 (1972).
3The four firms named in the complaint are Kellogg Co., General Mills, Inc.,
General Foods Corp., and the Quaker Oats Co. Also named in the complaint, but
not as respondents, are Nabisco, Inc. and Ralston Purina Co. See 3 TRADE REG. REP.
119,898, at 21,915 (1972).
4 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
5 The complaint alleged in part that:
Respondents have introduced to the market a profusion of RTE
[ready-to-eat] cereal brands. During the period 1950 through 1970
approximately 150 brands, mostly trademarked, were marketed by re-
spondents. Over half of these brands were introduced after 1960....
Respondents artificially differentiate their RTE cereals. Respondents
produce basically similar RTE cereals, and then emphasize and exag-
gerate trivial variations such as color and shape. Respondents employ
trademarks to conceal such basic similarities and to differentiate cereal
brands.
TRADE REG. REP., supra note 3, at 21,916.
6 See TRADE REG. REP., supra note 3, at 21,915. Other proposed orders would
require: divestiture of assets, including plants and other facilities; formation of new
corporate entities to engage in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of ready-to-eat
(RTE) cereals; prohibition of acquisitions of stock or assets of firms engaged in the
business of manufacturing or selling RTE cereals for a specific period of time; and
prohibition of practices found to be anticompetitive, including, but not limited to,
shelf space services or use of particular methods of selling or advertising and other
provisions appropriate to correct or remedy the effects of such anticompetitive prac-
tices. Id.
7 For a detailed study of what a generic term is and how a trademark can become
one see Zivin, Understanding Generic Words, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 173 (1973).
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der nor evaluates the effectiveness of compulsory trademark licensing as
a remedy for unfair trade practices.8 Rather, the pending cereal industry
case is used as a point of departure for an examination of the problem of
trademark abuse and the responses of the courts, the Congress, and the
FTC to it. Acknowledging the legality of compulsory licensing of trade-
marks, the article suggests legislation which will incorporate licensing and
standards for its application. Such legislation would make licensing an
accessible remedy for trademark abuse while accommodating both con-
sumer and competitor interests.
I. SOME ASPECTS OF TRADEMARK ABUSE
A. Impact on Competitive Interests
Although there is consensus that a trademark is a distinctive mark of
authenticity through which the products of particular manufacturers may
be distinguished from those of others,9 controversy continues concerning
the value of trademarks to producers and the propriety of trademarks in
a competitive economy.1 0 It is clear, however, that trademarks are an
important means by which producers of goods differentiate their products.
Product differentiation ax affects competitive interests in three ways.
First, by emphasizing the unique attributes of a product,' 2 product dif-
8 At least one recent study has examined the FTC's complaint against the cereal
manufacturers for the purpose of evaluating the economic basis for such an action
and determining whether section 5 authorizes the FTC to enforce an anti-oligopoly
strategem. See Note, Oligolopolies, Cereals, and Section Five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 61 GEO. L.J. 1145 (1973).
9 See 3 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 64 (3d
ed. 1967). See also Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970); Trademark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 87 (1879).
10 See Howarth, Are Trademarks Necessary?, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 228 (1970);
Joyce, Challenges to the Trademark System, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 453 (1968); O'Brien,
Why Have a Trademark Policy?, 58 TRADEMARK REP. 458 (1968); Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927). For a fuller
discussion of the economic impact of trademarks see Papandreou, The Economic
Eflect oj Trademarks, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 503 (1956); Brown, Advertising and the
Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
11 Product differentiation has been defined as the distinguishing of substitute
products from each other by advertising. Whereas buyers of a homogeneous product
regard the output of individual sellers as identical, and therefore perfect substitutes
in all respects, the buyer of a differentiated product regards it as superior or unique.
Thus, to some degree, buyers are willing to pay a premium price for it rather than
accept a lower-priced substitute. See 1 ANTITRUST LAW AND ECON. REV. 140 (July-
Aug., 1967).
12 Not all products are amenable to product differentiation. Those products not
sold to the consuming public, "producer goods," are sold to skilled purchasing agents,
aware of their specific needs and the technical properties required. Generally, these
products will not be subject to the nonrational appeals effective with consumers. See
Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called Product Diflerentiation,
18 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1968).
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ferentiation stabilizes the manufacturers' respective market shares.' 3 The
methods of differentiation are as varied as the factors that lead a person
to prefer one product over another. These distinguishing characteristics
include quality, design, packaging, and promotional techniques. 14 Second,
to the extent that product differentiation is effective, manufacturers can
capitalize on the consumer preferences which it develops to exercise a
certain amount of control over the price of their products without jeopar-
dizing their market position. 15 Finally, an established consumer brand
preference and the manufacturer's ability to charge a price in excess of
the competitive price form a barrier' 6 which may discourage new com-
petitors from seeking entry into the industry." Different sellers of closely
related products will frequently charge diverse prices and have dissimilar
13 Technically, the degree to which one product is a substitute for another can
be measured by the cross elasticity of demand between the goods. Cross elasticity is
defined as: percentage change in the quantity of good X demanded divided by the
percentage change in the price of good Y. Between close substitutes (fresh peas and
frozen peas, for example) a drop in the price of one will be reflected by a perceptible
decrease in the demand for the other, as consumers shift their buying patterns in
response to price. The closer the substitutability, the higher will be the products' cross
elasticity. Between products where consumers exercise preferences substantially based
on factors other than price, however, a slight decrease in the price of a specific pro-
duct will not result in the higher priced goods' losing most of its market share.
Certain consumers, although not all, will still be willing to pay somewhat more for a
preferred product. The greater the emphasis a consumer places on the differentiated
features of his preferred brands, the less impact a drop in competitors' prices will have.
Engaging in substantial product differentiation and convincing many consumers of the
product's uniqueness through advertising will thus insulate a manufacturer's market
share from the price competition to which it would otherwise be subject. See J. BAIN,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 212-13 (1959). R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 89
(3d ed. 1972).
14 See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114 (1956).
15 The impact of advertising on prices is by no means clear. When advertising is
the means for effecting new entry into an industry, competition in price or product
quality may be increased. It has been argued that promoting product differentiation
tends to raise the prices of products to consumers. It has also been noted, however,
that advertising's informational content allows consumers to locate low-priced sellers
more readily and therefore may tend to lower consumer prices. See generally J. BACK-
MAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION (1967); J. BACKMAN, TRADEMARKS IN ADVERTISING
AND SELLING (1966); N. BORDON, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADVERTISING (1944);
Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. LAW & ECON.
337 (1972); Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
16 Professor Bain has isolated three impediments to industry entry: scale economies,
absolute cost advantages of established firms, and product differentiation advantages.
In assessing the relative importance of these different barriers across twenty industries,
he concluded that economies of scale were mild barriers to entry into manufacturing
industries and absolute cost advantages of established firms were not a frequent source
of important barriers to entry. Product differentiation, however, was "a much more
important source of great or high barriers to entry.... Thus, product differentiation
advantages of established firms loom larger than any other source of barriers to
entry, and especially large as a source of high or very high barriers." J. BAIN, supra
note 13, at 249-50.
17 Barriers to entry are factors which impose higher costs per unit on newcomers
into an industry than those which are encountered by established firms, or disad-
vantages compelling new sellers to accept a lower price in order to be competitive.
See Mueller, The New Economics: A Structural Approach, 1 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV. 87, 89 n. 7 (1967).
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market shares. Changes in product design have an impact on market shares,
but market shares may also be affected by large advertising budgets. A bus-
iness that makes substantial advertising expenditures can justify them by
the premium price which their "unique" products can then command.
A new firm desiring to compete against established companies in an
industry typically encounters these obstacles, as well as others, in any
attempt to penetrate a market in which differentiated products exist.1
8
Potential competitors may avoid entering these industries and small rival
firms may find it impossible to remain in the industry as ongoing and
profitable concerns, thereby leaving extablished firms -to enjoy a degree of
monopoly profits. 19
B. Impact on Consumer Interests
Apart from the adverse effects that extensive trademark promotion has
on competition, a number of trademark-related practices also have detri-
mental impact on consumer interests. Perhaps nothing in the area of
consumer protection in recent years has attracted more attention and gen-
erated more critical commentary20 -than advertising practices. The impor-
tance of trademarks in advertising has long been recognized,'21 and it is
acknowledged that a trademark or brand name is a key element in mar-
keting many products, particularly consumer goods.
2 2
Notwithstanding the controversial nature of the subject, few econo-
mists contend that advertising and product differentiation have altogether
bad effects. 23 The more important question is how much advertising is
18 See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 1313, 1336 (1965) (contending that advertising increases barriers to entry by
raising total start-up investment in promotional expenses).
19 Advertising is an important factor in the diminished rivalry that characterizes
many oligopolistic markets. By creating brand loyalties that rival sellers find difficult
to erode, formidable barriers are created to new entry into concentrated markets. If it
costs Procter & Gamble, Colgate Palmolive, and Lever Bros. 2< to sell a bar of soap,
because they are established in the industry, it would cost a new entrant perhaps 2.2-.
The established firms can price up to 2.190 wihtout attracting new entry and
thereby realize a monopoly profit of .19<. See Posner, Working Paper for the Task
Force on Productivity and Competition: Advertising and Product Differentiation, 115
CONG. REC. 15,940 (1969).
20 See, e.g., R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC (1973); Scanlon,
Oligopoly and "Deceptive" Advertising: The Cereal Industry Affair, 3 ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REV. 99 (1970); Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contemporary FTC
Approach, 1 FORD. URBAN L.J. 349 (1973); Note, Corrcctive Advertising and the FTC:
No, Virginia, Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 374 (1971).
21 In a decision in which he described the use of trademarks as a means of adver-
tising, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "A trademark is a merchandising shortcut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants." Mishawaka Rubber & Wollen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205, 53 U.S.P.Q. 323, 326 (1942).
22 Backman, The Role of Trademarks in our Competitive Economy, 58 TRADEMARK
REP. 219 (1968).
23 Among the important functions of advertising are to inform buyers of avail-
able product alternatives, permitting them to make better choices among these
alternatives, and to identify brands, which enables a consumer to repeat satisfactory
purchases easily. Since advertised-brand goods vary little from week to week in quality,
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necessary24 and in what ways may a company fairly promote its pro-
ducts. 25 There is almost universal agreement that a significant portion of
advertising is either false or deceptive. 26 When product differentiation
and advertising are the bases of competitive rivalry, there may be a de-
cline in the quality of products and the substitution of insubstantial pro-
duct variation obscured by trademark proliferation.
-2
1
Children are particularly susceptible to intensive television advertising
campaigns. 28 Children who watch a moderate amount of television during
the hours that programming is devoted to their entertainment are advised
how and what to eat approximately ten times each hour. The range of
advertised goods is narrow and the same ads are often repeated in identi-
cal form many times during the same program. "The sell is hard; the
message is not educational. In other contexts we would call it brainwash-
ing and propaganda. ' ' -2 Not all potentially injurious advertising is aimed
at children. The FTC recently investigated misleading claims concerning
tires' effect on stopping distance"" and the nutritional value of various
tastes, texture, and general character, they are conveniently purchased products in
supermarket shopping. Advertised brands of consumer durables carry the goodwill
benefits accruing to guaranteed performance. These benefits are not actual warranty
protection, but in the nature of a consumer expectation of satisfaction based on
an established reputation. For an extended discussion of advertising and product dif-
ferentiation see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 324-45 (1971).
24The American economy invested $17 billion in advertising in 1968. Bristol
Meyers devoted 28 percent of its 1966 sales revenues to advertising. F. SCHERER,
supra note 23, at 325.
25 Several billion dollars have been invested in promotional packaging, such as
injection-molded, Yogi Bear plastic containers for children's bubble bath compound.
The drug industry spent an average of $3,000 per prescribing physician in promoting
prescription products, including all-expense-paid trips by doctors to New York City
for cocktail parties and theater tickets. See F. SCHERER, supra note 23, at 329-30.
26 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FTC
(1969), cited in 21 PuB. POLICY 203, 204 (1973).
27 See Scanlon, supra note 20, at 105.
28 Address by Gerald Thain, Assistant Director for National Advertising, Bureau
of Consumer Protection, FTC, before the Food and Drug Law Section of the ABA,
in New York City, July 7, 1971 cited in 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1097, 1104. Thain pointed
out the particular susceptibility of children to exploitation in advertising. He stated
that the staff of the FTC believes that special protection should be extended to children
where unfair or deceptive advertising threatens their ability to make a rational and
intelligent purchasing decision. He also indicated that this protection should be ex-
tended to a variety of vulnerable audiences, including the aged, handicapped, and
ghetto-dweller. 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1097, 1104-05. See also FTC v. R.F. Keppel &
Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 313 (1934), in which the Court affirmed a cease and desist order
issued by the FTC against the practice of selling "break and take" candy to children.
This form of merchandising induced children to buy inferior candy in hopes of
getting prizes and bonuses. Although actual deception was not involved, the Court
held that such practices were unfair since they preyed on the particular vulnerabili-
ties of children.
21 Hearings on Advertising and Small Business Before the Subcom. on Activities
of Regulatory Agencies Relating to Small Business of the House Select Comm. oil
Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 142 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
o30 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
19,773, at 21,814 (FTC 1971).
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foods. Literal reliance on such false claims might seriously impair one's
safety and health. The claims were judged to be deceiving even to adult
consumers.
31
Trademark proliferation, through the medium of advertising, also has
a detrimental effect on consumer interests. The cereal industry is repre-
sentative of other oligopolistic industries in its marketing and advertising
techniques. Testimony before the House Select Committee on Small Busi-
ness identified fifty-six different trademarked, ready-to-eat (RTE) cereals
that could be grouped by their nutritional value into four distinct
categories. 32 Without informative advertising, 33 it is virtually impossible for
the consumer to differentiate among the nutritional ingredients in so many
products. Moreover, rather than resort to informative advertising about
their products, cereal manufacturers consistently tell fanciful tales in their
commercial messages, without mentioning significant factual information
about the product itself.
34
The FTC has charged that extreme product proliferation is a source of
consumer confusion and constitutes an unfair practice in violation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.35 Advertising to promote trademarks
has, in some instances, diverted attention from the characteristics of the
products. While the cereal industry is regarded as a prominent offender
in this respect, many consumer product marketers engage in some of these
practices.36 The objections to trademark promotion are particularly strong
when the advertising does no more than persuade consumers that a par-
ticular brand is better than competing products that are physically indis-
tinguishable or differ only in minor respects. Consumers are precluded
from making real choices and are unaware that the long-run consequences
31 See Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,838, at 21,859
(FTC July 14, 1971) (proposed complaint); id., 20,045, at 22,026 (FTC June 27, 1972)
(complaint issued). The complaint alleged that commercials for Listerine Mouth-
wash falsely represented its effectiveness as a preventative treatment for colds and
sore throats. In J. B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967), the court
upheld the FTC's power to require affirmative disclosure that Geritol was not an
effective cure for people who were tired and run down when, in fact, iron deficiency
anemia, which Geritol remedies, was responsible for this condition in only a few
individuals. Future advertisements were forced to reveal that for persons not suffering
from this deficiency, the preparation would be of no benefit.
32 See 1971 Hearings, supra note 29, at 143.
33 Only about one-third of all commercial messages can be classified as informative.
Scherer, supra note 23, at 326.
34 Id. at 169.
3 5 See notes 2-6 and accompanying text supra. See also 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1970).
36 Other industries engaging in product differentiation, trademark promotion and
proliferation, and persuasive advertising are the cigarette, soap, detergent, and
bleach industries. Scherer, supra note 23, at 327-30. But see Scanlon, supra note 20,
at 107-08, in which the author considers advertising expenditures in the fresh meat
industry. In this industry, there is compulsory grade labeling for quality by government
inspectors. The result is an industry which is much less concentrated: the top four
firms control less than 25 percent of total sales. Advertising costs are practically nil,
and advertising practices lack the kind of misleading claims characteristic of major
oligopolies. There are only modest profits in the industry, representing approximately
8 percent after taxes on stockholder's equity. This is approximately one-third of
Kellogg's earnings rate.
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of their choices may include more market concentration and the addition
of a substantial premium to the price they pay for heavily advertised
brands.
II. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO TRADEMARK ABUSE
At common law, the right to maintain a trademark was fragile and legal
protection of this right could be lost in several ways. 37 The judiciary has
dealt with one of the problems generated by trademark rights by accept-
ing the defense 38 of genericism 39 in actions for trademark infringement.
There are two kinds of generic words: those which are inherently generic
because they have always named an article or class of articles, and those
which were originally trademarks but are no longer legally protected be-
cause they have lost their distinctiveness. 40 When the genericism defense
is raised successfully in the latter category, trademark rights are no longer
legally enforceable. 41 Any competitor may then market a similar product
and adopt the previously trademarked name.4 2 Judicial acceptance of the
genericism analysis has necessarily obviated the need for compulsory licens-
ing. It employs a more drastic measure: the outright loss of trademark rights.
The theory underlying the defense of genericism has its roots in the
source identification function of a trademark.4 :1 In identifying the source
of production or manufacture, trademarks protect the consuming public
37 For a comprehensive discussion of judicial interference with trademark rights
see Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1226 (1949).
38An alternative procedure to raising genericsm as a defense is to bring a
petition for cancellation of registration before the United States Patent Commissioner.
See, e.g., Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (1950).
9 Generic words are names of particular articles or classes of articles, such as
chair, pill, or elevator. Generic names can never qualify as legally protected trade-
marks as long as they are the names by which products themselves are known to the
public or the relevant trade. See Zivin, supra note 7.
40 Many words which are presently generic were initially protected by trademark.
Some of the more common trademarks which have been lost to gencricism are aspirin,
cellophane, escalator, cola, shredded wheat, and milk of magnesia. U.S. TRADEMARK
ASS'N, TRADEMARK MANAGEMENT 75 (1955).
41 Technically, trademark rights may be lost through abandonment, laches, or ac-
quescence. The distinctions among the three are often blurred. Laches refers to the
failure of a trademark proprietor to make a timely objection to the use of his mark
by another. The loss of a trademark by laches may also be called implied acquiescence
or acquiescence by operation of law. This is in contrast to actual acquiescence or
intentional abandonment of a trademark by consciously transferring it to another
or consenting to its use by others. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 9, at 514 (1967 ed.).
42 See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 39 U.S.P.Q. 296
(1938), in which Kellogg acquired the right to market a pillow-shaped breakfast
cereal under the previously trademarked name "shredded wheat" when the court
found this term to be generic.
43 The classical function of source identification, rather than its widely acknowledged
present importance as an instrument of advertising, has influenced the development
of trademark law. See F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925). At least one author feels, however, that the source
indicator function has been supplanted by the advertising function, noting that the
source indicating function, apart from its importance in advertising has no independ2nt
significance. See 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 9, at 16.
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from deception. 44 If the trademarked name has become so familiar that
it is no longer recognized by the public as referring to the product of a
particular manufacturer, no deception is involved. Thus, when a trade-
mark has become generic in the public's understanding, there is no justi-
fication for continuing to afford it legal protection.
45
A trademark generally becomes a generic term in one of three ways: a
trademark proprietor may use the trademark inappropriately; the expira-
tion of an underlying patent may render the term generic; or the trade-
mark may be improperly used by competitors or the public without effective
policing measures by the proprietor.46 In Haughton Elevator v. See-
berger,47 a petition for cancellation of the trademark "escalator" was
granted when it was found that the Otis Company, the trademark propri-
etor, had used the term descriptively rather than as an indication of or-
igin.48 Although the decision rested primarily on the company's own
consistent neglect to attach trademark significance to the name escalator,
the court's opinion also noted that the general public recognized "escala-
tor" as a generic name for a moving stairway. 49 Inappropriate use of a
trademark by its proprietor was also considered in Bayer Co. v. United
Drugs.50 In the Bayer case, the trademark proprietor adopted the chem-
44 See Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The New York Approach to the
Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 237 (1969). Dole
endorses the ABA House of Delegates proposal for a Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, providing an injunctive remedy to consumers in cases of deceptive
advertising and other related trade practices.
45 In DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936),
DuPont sued to enjoin infringement of its trademark, "Cellophane," by defendant
who was supplying his customers a celluloid substance in response to their requests
for cellophane. The Court held that consideration must be given to the public's
understanding of the word. "The rights of the complainant must be based on a
wrong which the defendant has done to it by misleading customers as to the origin
of the goods sold. ... Such rights are not founded on a bare title to a word but on
a cause of action to prevent deception." Id. at 81.
46 Section 45 of the Lanham Act provides:
[a] mark shall be deemed to be "abandoned"
(a) When any course of conduct of the registrant, including acts of
omission as well as commission, cause the mark to lose its signifi-
cance as an indication of origin.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970) (orginally enacted as Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 45,
60 Stat. 427). See Zivin, supra note 7, at 178. Sophisticated techniques have been
developed by business to police the misuse of trademarks by failure to acknowledge
their trademark status. Many companies promulgate internal manuals on proper trade-
mark usage. When trademark misuse occurs, it is common for a proprietor to send
letters informing the party of the improper usage, explaining the importance of the
investment in a trademark, and soliciting cooperation in using the symbol properly.
See U.S. TRADEMARK Ass'N, TRADEMARK MANAGEMENT, 67-88 (1955).
47 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (1950).
48 In advertising in trade magazines, Otis referred to its products as "Otis elevators
and Otis escalators." It is clear that the trademark emphasis was on "Otis" and "esca-
lator" was used generically, without any trademark significance. Similarly, in a model
Standard Safety Code for Elevators, Dumbwaiters & Escalators, representatives of
the Otis company defined an escalator as a moving inclined continuous stairway
used for raising and lowering passengers, without any indication that the term
designated the origin of the device. Id. at 81.
49 Id. at 81.
50 272 F. 505 (1921).
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ical formula, acetylsalicylic acid, as the generic term for "aspirin," which
was registered as a trademark. Because of its cumbersome generic name,
the compound was commonly referred to by its trademarked name both
within the pharmaceutical trade and by the public, despite Bayer's attempts
to preserve the validity of -the registered mark.5 ' In refusing to enjoin
independent druggists from using the mark in labeling their own com-
pounds, the court found the trademark had become descriptive, since
the public understood the trademark to refer only to the compound itself
and not to the specific Bayer product.52 The opinion indicated that a
trademark proprietor must do more than simply take steps to protect his
trademark. The proprietor must successfully educate the public to ac-
knowledge the status of his trademark as such.
Secondly, a trademark may become vulnerable to loss when its under-
lying patent expires. Trademark loss does not occur by operation of
law.53 If the trademark is used generically during the period of patent
protection, both the name and the product become part of the public do-
main upon expiration of the patent. In the "Shredded Wheat" case, 54 the
Supreme Court denied National Biscuit Company (Nabisco) the right to
retain the exclusive use of the trademark "shredded wheat" as applied to
a pillow-shaped breakfast cereal. Once the patent had expired, the Court
held, competitors acquired the right not only to produce the article, but
also to call it by the name by which it is generally known to the pub-
lic. 55
Finally, a trademark can be lost if it is improperly used by parties
other than trademark owner. 50 In Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & John-
51 Bayer promoted its products widely in trade journals and advertisements. Their
advertisements identified "Aspirin" as a trademark in the explanatory legend "The
word 'Aspirin' identifies it as the manufacture of the Bayer Company." When Bayer
shifted its emphasis from wholesale to retail distribution, boxes and tins were
marked with similar legends indicating the status of the product's name as a trademark.
Id. at 508.
The name of the major component of the compound commonly known as aspirin
is acetylsalicylic acid. It should be noted that the word "aspirin" is currently a
valid trademark in some countries. See M. BERAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADE-
MARK PRACTICE 50 (1970).
52 J. Learned Hand stated,
The single question, as I view it, in all these cases, is merely one of
fact: What do the buyers understand by the word for whose use the
parties are contending? If they understand by it only the kind of
goods sold, then, I take it, it makes no difference whatever what efforts
the plaintiff has made to get them to understand more.
272 F. at 509.
53 See, e.g., Denenberg, "Shredded Wheat"-The Stillborn Trademark, 34 TRADE-
MARK REP. BULL. 33, 36 (1939); Greenberg, The Eflect of Patent Expiration on
Trade-mark Rights, 34 TRADEMARK REP. 19 (1944).
54 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 39 U.S.P.Q. 296 (1938).
55 Singificantly, the Court found that there was no unfairness in Kellogg's sharing
in the goodwill and market created by Nabisco's skill, judgment, and vast advertising
expenditures. Moreover, the Court stated there was a strong public interest in the
free exercise of the right to share in such goodwill. 305 U.S. at 122.
56 Improper use may be made by the general public, disinterested third parties,
such as dictionary publishers, or competitors. See generally Ziven, supra note 7, at 189.
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son,57 the defendant intentionally appropriated the term "tips" in marketing
a cotton swab similar to the plaintiff's in hopes that the term would be-
come generic.5 8 The court held that the defendant's action infringed upon
the "Q-Tips" mark, and enjoined the use of the deceptively similar
term "Cotton Tips" as a trademark. Thus, once competitors begin to use
a -trademark as a generic expression, the proprietor's failure to make a
timely objection to the trademark misuse may result in abandonment
of the mark.59 Although a trademark proprietor may enjoy a commer-
cial monopoly on a trademark for an indefinite time, once the word be-
comes part of the public domain courts hold that it is unfair to restrict a
competitor's right to use it.6, Although public understanding of a trade-
mark as a generic expression may deprive the trademark owner of the
right to exclusive use, equity decrees are typically fashioned to give as
much protection to the proprietor as possible. Courts may protect the
proprietor by restricting the manner in which competitors can use the
trademark"1 or by limiting competitors' use of the ,trademark to that
sector of the economy which recognizes it as a generic term.
Although the courts have confronted the general problems involved in
57 108 F. Supp. 845 (1952).
58 The court found that after unsuccessful attempts to buy out Q-Tips, Inc., John-
son & Johnson decided on the trademark "Cotton Tips" in an effort to find a name
that would maximize its position as a Q-Tips competitor. Johnson & Johnson engaged
in an extensive in-house indoctrination program to establish the view that they had
always used the term "Cotton Tips" for their product and that they had consistently
attached trademark significance to its use. Since the name "Cotton Tips" was not
familiar to the buying public, the court found that the defendants sole purpose was
its desire to use a name as similar to Q-Tips as was legally possible. 108 F. Supp.
at 864.
59 See, e.g., King Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indust. Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 138
U.S.P.Q. 349 (2d Cir. 1963). When King Seeley became aware of the genericism
problem involving its trademark "Thermos," it policed the trade and notified persons
misusing the term of its trademarked status. The company failed to take affirmative
action, however, to protest the nontrade generic uses. After some years, a substantial
public education campaign was directed at the proper use of the term "Thermos"
and emphasis was placed on substituting the generic term, vacuum bottle, in common
parlance.
60 King Seeley enjoyed a monopoly on the word "thermos" for over fifty years.
Despite their efforts to protect their trademark, the court found that 75 percent of the
adults in the United States who were familiar with vacuum bottles called them
"thermos" bottles and only 12 percent were aware that term had any trademark
significance. Id. at 579-81.
61 For example, King Seeley was entitled to retain exclusive use to its then current
forms of the trademark "Thermos" without change. Defendant was compelled to pre-
cede its use of the term with the possessive "Aladdin's" and was confined to using
the term thermos with a lower case "t". The court determined this was the proper
balancing of the potential competitive disadvantage to the defendant of King Seeley's
exclusive use versus King Seeley's right to as much protection as possible. The court
also believed the purchasing public had a right to know the source of the goods they
were buying. Id. at 577-81.
In the Bayer aspirin case, independent pharmacists were allowed to sell the aspirin
compound they produced to the general public under the name aspirin, because this
was the only term for the compound which the public recognized. Within the trade
however, only Bayer was entitled to use the word "aspirin." Bayer Co. v. United
Drugs, 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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trademark use, they have done so primarily where the questions con-
cerned a trademark proprietor's relinquishment, in some express or im-
plied sense, of his rights in a registered mark. The criteria developed to
deal with this problem were uncomplicated, though necessarily vague,
because the issues were rather simple ones of fact. The larger and much
more complex problems, associated with trademarks that are part of a
powerful advertising program and belong to a holder of a large share of a
given market, transcend the kind of analysis which the courts have previously
applied to most trademark cases. Simple issues of fact are not involved in
these cases. Rather, broad and complicated questions of economic policy
emerge. Courts are not well suited to conceive and implement answers to
the kinds of questions that complicated trademark abuse litigation raises.
The answers must grow out of public policy decisions with long-range
consequences, and these decisions are best made by Congress.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH tO TRADEMARK ABUSE
No single federal program or statute has attempted direct and exclusive
treatment of trademark proliferation and its harmful effect on both com-
petitor and consumer interests. There are, however, three federal statutes
which deal with the general problem: the Lanham Act;62 the Wheeler-Lea
amendment to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act; 63 and
two FTC programs dealing with deceptive advertising.6 4
A. The Lanham Act
The Lanham Act, passed in 1946, instituted a system of federal trade-
mark registration and provided access to federal courts without the stan-
dard jurisdictional prerequisites.6 5 When a trademark is registered under
the Lanham Act, federal trademark law is dispositive, even when the action
is brought in a state forum. 66 Although the Lanham Act does not preempt
state registration systems and is not the exclusive remedy for a trademark
owner, as the benefits of federal trademark registration become more ap-
parent, trademark litigation should increasingly be governed by federal
law.67
Two sections of the Lanham Act deal tangentially with the problem of
trademark abuse resulting from excessive trademark promotion and pro-
liferation. The first is section 43(a), which provides a right of action to
persons who are likely to be injured by false or misleading representa-
62 60 Stat. 440 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970)).
63 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1973).
64 See part III C infra.
65 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
66 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1963); Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in
Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1178 (1963).
67 Id. at 1179.
[ VOL. 7:644
Trademark Licensing
tions in connection with goods in commerce.68 In this section, Congress
intended to fashion a new federal remedy to deal with a particular kind
of unfair competition that previously had been protected under common
law. 69 Section 43(a) provides a civil damage remedy against anyone using
a false designation of the origin or false description of goods in com-
merce. 0 The section was intended to promote fair business dealings. 71
Although trademarks are not specifically mentioned in this section of the
Lanham Act, early interpretations of the section 43(a) prohibitions con-
strued them to encompass only those misrepresentations 'that were of sub-
stantially the same economic character as those involving infringement or
other improper uses of trademarks.72
In 1963, the Sixth Circuit stated that section 43(a) protection would be
afforded only for false representations of geographical origin or false
representations as to source or origin of manufacture. 73 This narrow
application of section 43(a) has been criticized,74 and the line of cases
subsequently decided under section 43(a) reveals that grounds for relief
have been expanded somewhat. 75 However, the trend of the cases makes
68 Section 43(a) provides:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent
the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce,
and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such desig-
nation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the
same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to
any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action
by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that
of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use
of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1970).
69 See, e.g., American Rolex Watch Corp. v. Jack Laufer & Jan Voort, Inc., 176 F.
Supp. 858, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). Where defendant falsely represented his product
to be that of the plaintiff, the court held that Congress intended to fashion a new
federal remedy against the civil wrong of false representation of goods in commerce,
a kind of unfair competition that the common law effectively prevented.
70 Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1958)
(No intent to deceive is requred.).
' See Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949).
72 See, e.g., Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221-22
(D. Mass. 1949), ajf'd, 180 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1950) in which the court stated that
the purpose of section 43(a) was not to be iterpreted to bring any kind of undesir-
able business practice which involves deception within the scope of the Lanham Act.
Unfair competition in commerce must not be construed to refer to any competitive
practice which, in the broad meaning of the words, might be called unfair, but to that
"unfair competition" which has been closely associated with the misuses of trade-
marks, i.e., the passing of one's own goods as those of a competitor. Id. at 222.
73 Federal-Mogul-Bower-Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 1963).
Defendant imitated plaintiff's products so as to falsely represent them in interstate
commerce; plaintiff was granted relief under section 43(a).
74 See Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Its Development and Potential,
3 LOYOLA U.L.J. 327 (1972).
75 Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanhan Act: You've
Come A Long Way, Baby-Too Fat-, Maybe? 49 IND. L.J. 84 (1973).
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it clear that the standard of "unfair competition" will not be expanded to
be synonymous with -the broader standard of "unfair methods of compet-
ition in commerce," which is the foundation of a violation of section 5 of
the FTC Act. 76 Moreover, although the language of the statute confers
a cause of action upon any person who believes that he is likely to be
damaged by the false representation, the courts have consistently denied
standing to consumers suing for relief under the Lanham Act.77 In 1971,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reiterated that the congres-
sional intent was to protect persons engaged in commerce and that this
protection was not designed for consumers. The remedy is available exclu-
sively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against un-
scrupulous conduct.
7s
From the commercial point of view, section 43(a) has an even more
fundamental inadequacy. The notion of "falsity" itself is not readily sus-
ceptible to expansion to meet the wider range of trademark problems
that have arisen.79 For example, section 43(a) does not embrace the con-
cept that it is improper to trademark and promote a product that does not
seem substantially different from other products already on the market.
In light of the judicial development and application of section 43(a), the
section seems to be an inadequate safeguard against abusive trademark
promotion and proliferation, especially for the consumer.
Section 14 of the Lanham Act sots out the grounds and procedures
for cancellation of a trademark registration.89 Section (c) codifies the
common law grounds for cancellation, including genericism, s' and allows
the FTC among others to apply for cancellation. Section 14 was most
76 See notes 58-65 and accompanying text supra.
77 For example, in an action by the state of Florida on behalf of a class of con-
sumers who sustained injuries by using a drug with a label that falsely represented
its effectiveness and failed to provide adequate warning, the court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that members of the public have no cause of action
under the Lanham Act. Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F.
Supp. 364, 367 (D. Fla. 1971).
is Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
79 See Germain, supra note 75, at 99.
80 15 U.S.C. § 1064 provides in part:
A verified petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the
grounds relied upon, may, upon payment of the prescribed fee, be filed
by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the
registration of a mark on the principal register. ...
(c) at any time if the registered mark becomes the common descriptive
name of an article or substance, or has been abandoned, or its registra-
tion was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of section 4
or subsections (a), (b) or (c) of section 2 of this Act for a registration
hereunder, or contrary to similar prohibitory provisions of said prior
Acts for a registration thereunder, or if the registered mark is being
used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent
the source of the goods or services in connection with which the mark
is used ....
81 Section 1027 of the Lanham Act defines the abandonment of a trademark as
including loss through genericism. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970). See also note 51 supra.
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recently amended by Congress in 1962. The FTC, in anticipation of the
legislative reform, submitted a report suggesting an amendment to section
14(c). The amendment requested that the FTC be given jurisdiction to
cancel a registered mark which was descriptive at the time of registration
as well as one which acquires a descriptive character following registra-
tion. Congress declined to enact the modification at that time, characteriz-
ing the proposed amendment as a "housekeeping measure" intended to
clarify miscellaneous provisions of the FTC Act rather than to make
substantive changes in policy.
82
B. The Wheeler-Lea Amendment
Section 5 of the FTC Act originally prohibited "unfair methods of
competition in commerce.183 In 1938, the Wheeler-Lea amendment was
added as a supplementary measure to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices" in commerce.8 4 In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson,8' the
Supreme Court discussed the impact of the Wheeler-Lea Act on FTC
jurisdiction. The Court held that section 5 of the act empowers the Com-
mission to prohibit, as unfair, those practices which directly injure con-
sumer interests, regardless of whether or not antitrust questions are
raised., 6 Although touted by some as the foundation of a new and vig-
82S. REP. No. 2107, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1108, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1961). In a letter to Emanuel Celler, dated August I1, 1961, Paul Rand
Dixon, then chairman of the FTC, stated that the Patent Office registered trademarks
which were descriptive at the time of registration but not then recognized to be so.
He noted that the need for action in the public interest to terminate trademark
monopolies occurs most frequently in connection with marks which are in fact
descriptive of the products to which they are applied. Dixon urged Congress to
change the statute to permit cancellation of registered trademarks upon proof of the
same facts that would have prevented registration at the time of application.
83 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1970)).
84 Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(l)
(1970)). The purpose of the amendment was discussed in the House report:
[Tihis amendment make[s] the consumer, who may be injured by
unfair trade practices, of equal concern before the law, with the
merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of the
dishonest competitor.
H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). See also S. REP. No. 1705, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
Apart from its acknowledged thrust at consumer protection, the Wheeler-Lea
amendment had a second purpose. The amendment was designed to preempt another
measure, urged by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which would have
imposed stringent criminal penalties on parties engaging in unfair advertising. Addi-
tionally, the amendment was a response to industry's desire to see certain deceptive
practices stopped because they adversely affected business as a whole, by giving an
entire industry a bad reputation and reducing demand for the generic product or by
compelling all members of the industry to adopt similar methods in self-defense. To
prevent this result, businessmen sought to use the FTC as an arbitrator among them-
selves as to unfair or uneconomic practices. Stone, The FTC and Advertising Regula-
tion: An Examination of Agency Failure, 21 PuB. POLICY 203, 217-26 (1973).
85 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 405
U.S. 233 (1972).
8 6 See Note, 1972 Wis. L. REV. supra, note 28, at 1082 (contains an analysis of the
decision).
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orous FTC consumer protection program, not all commentators on the
Wheeler-Lea amendment have been so enthusiastic. In Consumer Protec-
tion Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, it was reported
that the FTC deals with cases involving only marginal harm to consumers
and ignores gross deception perpetrated by larger firms advertising in
mass media.87 As one commentator suggests, the failure of section 5
stems partly from the fact that the remedial scheme provides no penalty
that the government can initially impose and no threat of monetary liabil-
ity to consumers."8 The amendment focuses on eliminating past wrongs,
primarily by means of cease and desist orders, which are the FTC's main
tool for forestalling future unlawful conduct. s1 The cease and desist order
is curative, 90 rather than preventative medicine.
Much has been written about the scope of the FTC's discretion in
fashioning remedies.91 In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, the Court
pointed out that the legislative history of the FTC Act made it clear that
Congress intended the Commission to have a great deal of discretion in
defining those practices which come within the prohibitions of the Act.
2
The FTC is empowered and directed to prevent unfair methods of com-
petition as well as unfair or deceptive acts and practices in commerce.
3
Under this general statutory language, the courts have allowed the FTC a
great deal of latitude in shaping remedies for violations of section 5 .4
87 See Hearings on S. 2246, S. 3092, and S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subconzin.
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971). See also Stone,
supra note 84, at 205.
88 In light of the numerous advertising claims made each day, the likelihood of a
deceptive advertiser's getting caught by the FTC is slim. Although stringent criminal
or harsh civil penalties might deter these practices, the FTC Act and the Wheeler-Lea
amendment have not imposed them. Stone, supra note 84, at 224-25. See also Sebert,
Obtaining Monetary Redress for Consumers Through Action by the Federal Trade
Commission, 57 MINN. L. REV. 225 (1972). Sebert suggests that the FTC has authority
to compel a respondent to make monetary restitution to an injured consumer where
such restitution is appropriate to terminate a continuing unfair practice.
89 Stone, supra note 84, at 225.
90 The goal of this supplemental legislation is simply to codify trends presently de-
veloping in consent decrees to achieve consistency in judicial and agency application.
As a result, no effort is being made to build in punitive measures. Corrective
remedies are in keeping with the legislative intent underlying FTC jurisdiction while
adequate punitive measures exist under antitrust legislation.
91 See generally Comment, Corrective Advertising-The New Response to Con-
sumer Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 415 (1972); Note, The FTC Substantiation
Program, 61 GEO. L.J. 1427 (1973); Comment, Psychological Advertising: A New
Area of FTC Regulation, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1097; Comment, Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act-Unfairness to Consumers, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 1071.
92 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972).
93 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
94 Although indicating, in Herzfeld v. FTC, 104 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1944), that an
FTC order requiring a company to modify its name to avoid a potentially deceptive
connotation was more sweeping than desirable in that instance, the Second Circuit,
in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, refused to modify the order, stating that the
Supreme Court had circumscribed their authority to review the remedies prescribed
by administrative agencies. Id. at 209.
Two years after the Herzfeld decision, the Supreme Court established the "reason-
able relation" test which has become the accepted standard for determining the
legality of a remedy selected by the FTC. Under this standard the courts will modify
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Although this flexibility is to some extent desirable for an agency such as
the FTC, too much discretion, as well as too little, can make a program
which regulates abusive practices ineffective. Given too many options, the
FTC has often unwisely chosen the violations which it will prosecute and
those it will not.95
C. Advertising Regulation Programs
Using its broad discretion, the FTC has initiated two programs specifi-
cally directed at advertising abuse.9 6 The first, the Ad Substantiation pro-
gram, is based on the theory that section 5 gives the Commission the
power to declare unsubstantiated advertising to be unfair and deceptive.
The FTC's program requires advertisers to submit on demand all tests,
studies, or other data which purport to substantiate the suspect claims." 7
The goal of the ad substantiation program is to provide additional data to
facilitate the consumer's rational purchasing choices' s and to deter un-
founded advertising claims.
Corrective advertising, the second FTC program, is aimed at mitigating
residual effects of untrue or deceptive claims, which leave false impres-
sions in the consumer's mind even after the deceptive advertising has
been eliminated.119 Studies indicate that consumers experience a delayed
response to advertising and suggest that even the most innocuous adver-
tising will cause consumers to recall previous claims. The FTC typically
requires the violating company to cease and desist advertising the product
for an extended period of time, or, alternatively, to devote a substantial
proportion of its advertising budget to disclosing the false statements pre-
viously made.100
Although both programs should benefit the consumer, neither is flaw-
less. The major problem with ad substantiation is the delay between the
remedial orders of the FTC only where the remedy selected has no reasonable
relation to the unlawful practices found. The Supreme Court noted Congress' intent
to establish the FTC as an
expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the
unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has
wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where
the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices
found to exist. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946).
95 See generally R. POSNER, supra note 20.
9 See generally Scanlon, FTC & FCC Counter Ad Controversy, 5 ANTITRUST L.
& ECON. REV. 43 (1971); Thain, Consumer Protection Advertising-The FTC Re-
sponse, 27 Bus. LAW. 891 (1972); Thain, Corrective Advertising, 19 N.Y.U.L.F.
(1973); Corrective Advertising-The New Response To Consumer Deception, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 415 (1972); Note, Advertising and Shared Monopoly in Consumer
Goods Industries, 9 COLUM. J. OF L. AND SOC. PROB. 241 (1973); Powell, Protection
of Children in Broadcast Advertising, 26 FED. COMMUNICATIONS BAR J. 61 (1973).
97 Section 6(b) of the FTCA specifically empowers the Commission to require in-
dustries to file special reports and answer specific questions upon request. The Com-
mission may make these reports public as long as they do not contain secrets or
customer lists. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b), (f) (1970).
9s Note, supra note 91, at 1435.
99 See generally Note, supra note 20.
100 See note 31 supra.
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initial request for substantiation materials and the removal of the adver-
tisement, if it is found to be unsupportable in fact. Moreover, the con-
sumer is generally unaware of the program and does not know how to
get the needed information. Also, the technical and voluminous data are
largely worthless in evaluating the merits of a product.
Similarly, corrective advertising, although a legally proper and useful
remedy, is subject to shortcomings. Perhaps the most significant draw-
back is a product of the tremendous number of advertising claims made
daily. The potential for isolating and successfully prosecuting more 'than a
few false claims is minimal. There is also a time lag between the con-
sumer's initial exposure to the deceptive claim and the appearance of the
corrective advertising. It is difficult to determine the extent to which reli-
ance on the false claims will lead to purchase decisions before 'the correc-
tive advertising reaches consumers. Moreover, the corrections may not
reach the same consumers who were exposed to the previous advertising.
Thus, none of the existing federal controls adequately treats the prob-
lem of trademark proliferation. The Lanham Act only deals with false
representations of geographical origin or source of manufacture and can-
not be-used by consumers. The Wheeler-Lea amendment, while recogniz-
ing consumer interests, leaves consumer protection to the FTC.10 1 The
FTC's advertising regulation programs have been marked by major en-
forcement and effectiveness problems. It is evident that, although rem-
edial action is arguably possible under any one of several judicial, stat-
utory, and regulatory doctrines, no doctrine directly addresses the
problem of trademark abuse.
IV. FTC CONSENT DECREE PROCEEDINGS
Cases involving trademark practices which are against the public inter-
est have been resolved primarily in consent decree proceedings either
before the FTC or the Department of Justice. FTC consent decrees may
include compulsory public dedication of trademarks. Consent decrees are
contracts, between the Commission or the Department of Justice and the
party, that are entered before tesimony is taken on the facts. 1'2 Seventy-
five percent of the FTC's proceedings are terminated by this method.
1° 3
As a result, relatively few trademark abuse cases processed by the FTC
have been litigated in the courts. Representative of these consent decree
cases are United States v. A. B. Dick'"4 and United States v. Wallace
& Tierman Co.' o5 In the former case, A. B. Dick was found to be
engaged in a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize the duplicating
101 See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), in which
the court held private parties have no right of action to enforce provisions of the
FTC Act against a corporation engaged in false and deceptive advertising.
102 See generally Timberg, A Primer on Antitrust Consent Judgments and FTC
Consent Orders, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 567 (1973).
103 Id. at 567.
104 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62,233 (D. Ohio 1948).
105 1954 Trade Cas. 67,828 (D. R. 1. 1954).
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equipment industry. The consent decree required, in part, that the defend-
ants dedicate their trademark, "Mimeograph," to the public without
compensation. 10 6 In Wallace & Tierman, manufacturers and distributors
of chlorinating equipment and supplies had violated the Sherman Act by
express allocation of markets, price fixing, and exclusive contracts with
persons in the sale, servicing, and distribution of chlorinating equipment.
The final decree required the defendants to grant, royalty free, nonexclu-
sive licenses for the manufacture, sale, and use of the patents involved in
the antitrust violations. The court further enjoined the defendants from
initiating suits for patent infringement for a period of ten years. With re-
spect to the -trademarks involved in the action, the defendants were or-
dered to take whatever steps were necessary to dedicate three machinery
trademarks to the public without compensation and were enjoined from
maintaining any suit based on infringement of any trademark interest in
the three dedicated marks.
10 7
Traditionally, the FTC has not approached the question of trademark
abuse directly. The Commission has dealt with trademark abuse only in
the context of broader problems such as antitrust violations. FTC requests
for trademark remedies have been an exercise in juggling sanctions to fit
other larger crimes. The legislative mandates in the FTC Act and the
Clayton Act have been used sporadically to fashion ad hoc remedies to
the problems these statutes address by manipulating the status of the
trademarks in -the offending party's possession. Yet the language of these
statutes is too vague and imprecise to deal with the complicated problems
raised by trademark abuse. The FTC is designed to apply the broad pol-
icies implicit in its enabling legislation to specific and varied cases. It
cannot effectively apply policy which the legislature has not yet stated.
V. PROPOSAL FOR COMPULSORY TRADEMARK LICENSING
A. The Trademark License
The earliest view of trademark licensing relied on the "source theory"
of trademark protection. Under this theory, trademark licensing was le-
gally, if not conceptually, impossible because trademarks were thought to
represent to the consumer only the physical source or origin of the prod-
uct labeled by the trademark.108 Early common law cases held that a
trademark could not be licensed unless the licensor transferred his entire
business along with his trademark to the licensee."'0 Such arrangements
hardly constituted licensing and, in any case, were not flexible enough to
remain viable in a sophisticated economy.
106 1948-49 Trade Cas. 62,233 (D. Ohio 1948).
107 1954 Trade Cas. 67,828 (D.R.I. 1954).
108 See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 631
(1973).
109 See, e.g., American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1942);
Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 3 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1924); Bulte v.
Igleheart Bros., 137 F. 492 (7th Cir. 1905); Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver
Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468 (8th Cir. 1901).
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A more useful approach to licensing was made possible when the
courts recognized that a trademark indicated not only the source of a
product to the consumer, but the quality of the product as well. 110 In-
deed, the Lanham Act itself implicitly recognized the quality-identification
function of a trademark and allowed for permissive licensing on this ba-
sis."' Currently, the courts allow trademark licensing rather freely, as
long as certain conditions are met. 112 The most restrictive of these condi-
tions is that the license granted must not be "naked. '113 That is, the
licensee must not be allowed to place the mark on any type of good or
service, thereby to make the mark's reputation for quality meaningless
and constitute fraud on the consumer.114 Courts have insisted that li-
censors of trademarks retain some control over the quality of the product
that their licensees are labeling with the common trademark. Although
control is universally required, it is by no means certain how much or
what kind of control will pass the test of any given court. If there is in-
sufficient licensor control, the license may be found "naked" and the
trademark consequently abandoned; 1 5 if there is too much control, there
may be an antitrust violation. 11 6 These kinds of problems notwithstand-
ing, trademark licensing has long been recognized as a particularly advan-
tageous method of distributing the economic benefits of a good product or
service. The law currently sanctions licensing on a permissive basis. Where
trademark abuse exists to the detriment of both other competitors and
consumers the law should also require licensing on a compulsory basis.
B. A Compulsory Trademark Licensing Statute
Trademark regulation for abuses other than those traditionally assoc-
iated with trademark infringement is in an embryonic stage. Compulsory
110 For a general discussion of this transition in judicial analysis see Grismore,
The Assignment of Trademarks and Trade Names, 30 MIcH. L. REV. 489 (1932);
Isaacs, Traffic in Trade Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1931); Schechter, The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927). See also Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
111 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1970). See also 1 J. McCarthy, supra note 108, at
637-39.
112 See, e.g., Franchised Stores of New York, Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.
1968); Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1967); Sterling Drug
Co. v. Lincoln Laboratories, 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963); Denison Mattress Co. v.
Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,
267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp., 167
F.2d 484 (C.C.P.A. 1948).
113 See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971); Heaton Dis-
tributing Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1967); Broeg v.
Duchaine, 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E.2d 466 (1946).
114 See Societe Comptoir v. Alexander's Dep't Store, 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962);
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); Huntington
Nat'l Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp., 201 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1962).
115 See, e.g., National Trailways Bus System v. Trailway Van Lines, 269 F. Supp.
352 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Evelyn Wood Reading Dynamics Institutes v. Zimmerman,
134 U.S.P.Q. 475 (N.D. Cal. 1962); Morse-Starrett Products Co. v. Steccone, 86 F.
Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
116 See McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and A ntitrust: The Trouble With
Tie-ins, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1085 (1970).
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licensing is a common judicial remedy in cases of abuse of patent priv-
ileges leading to antitrust violations.1 17 The goal of the compulsory li-
cense in these cases has been to restore competition within the industry.
Royalty-free licensing and the more extreme remedy of public trademark
dedication have become accepted in consent decree proceedings. How-
ever, little judicial consideration has been given to trademark licensing
apart from its permissive status under the Lanham Act. The value of
statutory codification of the compulsory licensing remedy for trademark
abuse affecting consumers is two-fold. First, codification would legitimize
and clarify compulsory licensing, thereby removing all doubt as to its
availability in administrative proceedings. Second, new legislation would
notify businesses that the rights they acquire by virtue of a valid federal
trademark are not without certain limitations if these rights are abused
in promotional business practices.
There is a need for legislation designed specifically to correct the abuse
of trademarks, thereby supplementing section 14 of the Lanham Act.11
Under the proposed compulsory licensing legislation, the FTC could com-
pel the licensing of any trademark for a specified period of time, or inde-
finitely, where unfair or deceptive acts and practices in trademark pro-
117 The origins of the rights and privileges which patents and trademarks respec-
tively enjoy are much different in theory. Patents are constitutionally authorized to
create a monopoly in the production of a product for a limited term. Trademarks
are a part of the common law, intended to confer no monopoly privileges, but merely
to distinguish one manufacturer's products from another's. Barring abandonment,
cancellation, or public dedication a trademark may last forever. In the area of
section 5 violation, however, an analogy is justified in terms of the effect sought by
the remedy. In both cases, the goal is to increase competition, remove unjustified re-
straints on trade, and, where possible, lower prices. Judicial decisions have fully
recognized the remedy of compulsory patent licensing for violations of both the
Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. See Comment, 59 N.W.U.L. REv. 543
(1965).
In two leading cases, Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945),
and United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947), compulsory patent
licensing was required for antitrust violations. In Hartford, the Supreme Court upheld
a district court decision which imposed compulsory licensing to remedy a conspiracy
to monopolize the glassmaking industry. Hartford was required to license the patents
involved at reasonable royalty rates. More recently in American Cyanamid v. FTC,
363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), the FTC ordered compulsory licensing of patents in-
volved in a price-fixing arrangement between six major drug companies. All six were
found guilty of violations of section 5 of the FTC Act. In United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af0'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954), the Court approved compulsory patent licensing as an antitrust remedy where
the violation was not the result of patent misuse. In that case, the defendant was
found guilty of having monopolized the market in violation of the Sherman Act by
virtue of its overwhelming strength in the shoe machinery industry. To dissipate the
effects of monopolization, the court entered a decree forcing United Shoe to make
its patents available to its competitors on a reasonable royalty basis. The consistent
justification in all court-decreed licensing cases has been not so much punitive as
remedial. One commentator has observed that the courts have felt compulsory licensing
was the only effective means of restoring competition within the industry. See Note,
Compulsory- Patent Licensing By Antitrust Decree, 56 YALE L.J. 77, 87 (1946).
Analysis has shown that licensing has effectively increased competition. See Frost,
Compulsory Licensing and Patent Dedication Provisions of Antitrust Decrees, 1 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 127 (1957).
11s 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970).
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motion have created unreasonable barriers to competitors' entry into the
industry. Licensing could also be imposed where trademark promotion
has impeded the availability of goods of the highest quality at the lowest
competitive prices. Since the goal of licensing is essentially remedial, the
licensee would be required to pay reasonable royalties to the trademark
owner. The royalty structure would be established through bilateral nego-
tiations between the trademark owner and any party wishing to use the
mark, subject to -the approval of the final arrangement by the FTC.
Ann's-length bargaining would allow the trademark owner adequate com-
pensation for his investment in developing goodwill and public recogni-
tion for his product. FTC supervision and approval of the royalty struc-
ture is imperative to ensure that royalties are not so high as to discourage
potential licensees, and that -the royalties charged do not force licensees to
implement a pricing schedule equal to, or higher per unit than, that of
the original trademark proprietor.
Quality control has been an essential ingredient in trademark licensing
agreements, not only in the United States but also in other countries."-)
The guaranteed-quality theory of trademark is based on the assumption
that the actual origin of a product is less important to a consumer than
a consistent standard of quality on which he may rely.' 20 Allowing the
trademark proprietor to establish uniform minimum standards of quality
control is important to both his own interest and consumer interests. Con-
sistent quality would assure that the proprietors' established reputation
and goodwill would not be undermined by inferior goods and that con-
sumers' expectations would not be disappointed. -'2 1 Any compulsory
trademark licensing statute must contain provisions ensuring the mainte-
nance of quality control over the product produced by the licensee.
The new legislation should not be construed to allow the unlicensed use
of a registered trademark. Although any person would be -permitted to
become a licensee, in effect making a name brand into a generic term,
the licensing is designed to avoid the ad hod confiscation of a valuable
trademark right, i.e., the approach the FTC requests in its complaint
against the cereal manufacturers. Of course, the trademark proprietor's
market share would be diminished somewhat by the increase in competi-
119 See generally D. CAPLAN, BRITISH TRADEMARKS AND SYMBOLS (1966); H. Fox,
THE CANADIAN LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (1956); A. GREELEY,
FOREIGN PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1899); P. HERE-
WARD, HANDBOOK ON TRADEMARK LAWS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (1951); L. HOLM-
QUIST, DEGENERATION OF TRADEMARKS (1971); E. OFFNER, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
PROTECTION (1965); G. WEBSTER, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND DESIGNS IN AFRICA
(1961); Scheller, Problems of Licensing and Intent to Use In British Law Countries,
61 TRADEMARK REP. 445 (1971); Tergau, Compulsory Use of German Trademarks
After January 1, 1973, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 505 (1972).
120 See notes 107-113 and accompanying text supra. See also Comment, Trademark
Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Control, 1968 DUKE L.J. 875, 877.
121 Such quality control provisions are required under section 28 of the British
Trade Marks Act of 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 22. Under this permissive licensing statute,
a licensed trademark user must indicate its status as a registered user on the goods
or package involved. The actual trademark owner is also identified so that a licensee
does not deceive or mislead the public about the source of goods it represents.
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tion resulting 'from -the compulsory licensing. The trademark proprietor's
decreased revenues would be offset, in part, by royalty payments from the
licensee. By putting a legend on the product to -indicate its origin, the
policing burden on the trademark proprietor would be reduced.
C. Standards of Application
Under the proposed legislation, compulsory trademark -licensing would
be ordered by the FTC when it finds that, within any given industry, the
profits of one or more companies are higher than those of the industry as
a whole because of their insulation from normal competitive pressures;
that actual or potential competition within an industry has been retarded
by companies individually or collectively maintaining highly concentrated,
noncompetitive markets; that product innovation 'has been supplanted by
artificial product differentiation; -that companies are sharing -in noncom-
petitive market structures through the exercise of monopoly power, inten-
sive trademark promotion, brand proliferation, and artificial product dif-
ferentiation; that market position is maintained by extensive advertising
designed to emphasize inconsequential differences among products rather
than to provide the consumer with factual information on which to base
consumption decisions; or that intensive trademark promotion has, in
effect, erected economic and -psychological barriers to competitor entry
into the industry.
The procedural mechanism for implementing the proposed legislation
could be based on the existing procedure in unfair or deceptive -trade-
mark practices cases. 122 Like any action under section 5 of the FTC
Act, an action under the new statute would be instituted by means of a
complaint to the FTC and processed by a hearing on the merits. Once an
opinion is issued, it would 'be subject to appeal. The diversity of indus-
tries, products, and advertising approaches necessitates -that discretion
12a
be vested in the FTC to develop standards for application of the compul-
122 A proceeding is started before the FTC on its own initiative or at the request of
an outside party. In practice, approximately 95 percent of all complaints filed are
initiated by one competitor against another. Facts are ascertained by the staff of the
Chief Examiner's Office. Allegations of false advertising must be supported by
documentary evidence. Under informal voluntary procedures, the respondent may
agree to cease and desist specified practices without admitting any wrongdoing. A
consent decree may be agreed to within thirty days of the receipt of a proposed
complaint. The Commission's proceedings conclude with either a dismissal or the
issuance of an order to cease and desist. 4 R. CALLMAN, supra note 9, at 502. For a
discussion of the jurisdictional requirements of FTC action, see id. at 451-73. For a.
general description of the Commission's functions and powers see 3 TRADE REG. REP.
9500ff (1973). See also G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924);
Auerbach, The FTC: Internal Orgainzation and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383
(1964); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1969).
123 At least one commentator makes a strong argument for remedies which are
invoked automatically without the intervention of FTC discretion. Under this ap-
proach, if a producer of a trademarked good controls a substantial share of the
market, spends over a set percentage of sales revenue on advertising, or advertises
more than a specified number of minutes per day over broadcast media, he is subject
to compulsory licensing. See Stone, supra note 84, at 231.
SPING 19741
Journal of Law Reform
sory licensing remedy. Some legislative standards should be listed as
guides in the statute. Undoubtedly business interests would be quick to
exercise their rights under any new compulsory trademark licensing legis-
lation. Currently, most complaints brought before the FTC are initiated
by businessmen, who have a vested interest in protecting their own busi-
ness, an awareness of the legislation on which a complaint can be based,
precise information concerning the alleged violations, and the knowledge
of how to bring a lawsuit. 124 Absent some automatic mechanism to make
suspect trademark practices mandatory subjects for administrative review,
consumers' interests would be more difficult to protect. 125 Nevertheless,
consumer groups are gradually gaining awareness of the sophisticated ad-
vertising techniques that businesses use and may emerge as a significant
countervailing force representing the public interest. Moreover, once the
FTC files a complaint, or one is placed before it, the Commission must
assume responsibility for investigating the validity of the claim and con-
ducting the necessary adjudicative proceedings. This procedure would
remove the economic burden of private litigation from individual consu-
mers and shift it to the government, which can distribute the cost among
taxpayers as an expense of protecting consumer interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
The use and abuse of trademarks as promotional tools for business ac-
tivities have created genuine problems for both competitor and consumer
interests. Where trademark promotion has been used to establish noncom-
petitive markets, to supplant product innovation, and to erect barriers
that foreclose competitive forces within an industry, the FTC has begun
to take action against the alleged offenders under section 5 of the FTC
Act. One of the remedies that the FTC has recently requested is compul-
sory, royalty-free trademark licensing. Although the experience with both
compulsory patent licensing and permissive trademark licensing indicates
that these remedies can be effective in reestablishing competition in pre-
viously noncompetitive markets, the FTC's sporadic and tentative cur-
rent approach is not as constructive as it could be. Statutory codification
of the compulsory trademark licensing remedy would make it an element
of a deliberate legislative policy, thus encouraging its consistent applica-
tion in proper cases, lessening its confiscatory aspects, and alerting the
business community to both the dangers and the opportunities of using
trademark promotion to capture a large market share.
-Mara L. Babin
124 Id. at 232.
125 Id. at 232.
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